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In this paper, we study the asymmetric duopoly models of competing supply chains with 
financing uncertainty. The financing uncertainty of the green supply chain’s capacity 
investment could be available as complete or incomplete information to the traditional supply 
chain. By analyzing and comparing the optimal quantities, optimal prices, and optimal profits 
of both cases, we find that the financing uncertainty of capacity investment does not affect 
either chain’s choices of equilibrium quantities and prices in the complete information case. If 
this information is incomplete for the traditional supply chain, financing uncertainty plays an 
important role in determining optimal quantities and optimal prices, together with the lending 
interest rate. To encourage the use of environmentally friendly technologies, government 
should use per-unit subsidies if the green supply chain suffers the cost disadvantage, and should 
encourage financial institutions to provide preferential loans to the green supply chain that 
suffers manufacturing or retailing capacity restrictions.  
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In recent years, the development of green (or sustainable) supply chains has gained 
considerable attention from practitioners, researchers, and policy makers. In practice, a green 
supply chain may exhibit a relatively high production cost, because of its adoption of new and 
cleaner technology; however, manufacturing or retailing capacity restrictions impede the 
realization of the scale effect. As a result, green supply chains may disappear in intensely 
competitive markets, and chains may be left with no incentive to adopt environmentally friendly 
technologies. Hence, which kinds of policy measures would encourage the development of 
green supply chains when there are cost disadvantages or capacity restrictions? To answer this 
question, we analyze the asymmetric model of competing supply chains, based on previous 
literatures. 
Green (sustainable) supply chain management literature indicates that significant research 
has been done in the areas of operations and environmental science. Beamon (1999) introduces 
the concepts of green supply chain design. The overviews of green supply chain management 
literature can be found in Srivastava (2007), Carter and Rogers (2008), and Seuring and Müller 
(2008). Furthermore, Sarkis, et al. (2011) and Seuring (2013) review the organizational theorey 
and modeling research on green supply chain management, respectively. Eskandarpour et al. 
(2015) reviews the design of sustainable supply chain networks. Other interesting research 
cover the relationship between green supply chain management and the circular economy 
(Genovese et al., 2017), the performance evaluation of green supply chain management in 
practice (et al., 2005; Zhu et al., 2008; Varsei and Polyakovskiy, 2017), and the connection 
between green supply chain management and sustainable regional economic development 
(Zhang et al., 2015; Zhang and Xie, 2015; Zhang et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2017; Wu et al., 
2017).  
However, only a few of researchers study green supply chain management by using 
mathematical models, while these could help us to clearly identify the optimal strategy for green 
supply chain development and the effects of government policies (see the review of Badole et 
al., 2012). Among those literatures, McGuire and Staelin (1983) describe the pioneering study 
of the market with two competing supply chains in a game model. Bertrand competition (i.e., 
two supply chains that compete on price) between two supply chains is analyzed, and it is found 
that both manufacturers prefer a decentralized equilibrium if products are highly substitutable. 
Moorthy (1988), and Bonanno and Vickers (1988) find similar results in the extended Bertrand 
competition model and provide more explanations.  
Some work focus on enterprise risk management for competing supply chains. Wu et al. 
(2009) includes demand uncertainty in the Cournot competition (i.e., two supply chains 




chains under three possible strategies: Vertical Integration, Manufacturer’s Stackelberg, and 
Bargaining on the Wholesale price, and show that the first two strategies are two special cases 
of the last one. On the other hand, Fang and Shou (2015) discuss the Cournot competition model 
between two supply chains that are subject to supply uncertainty. Besides demand and supply 
uncertainties, there are still many possible enterprise risks in supply chain competition (Olson 
and Wu, 2010, 2017; Heckmann,et al., 2015). Among these potential risks that an enterprise 
may faces, some researchers notice the capacity-related enterprise risk (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; 
Cucchiella and Gastaldi, 2006; Wu et al., 2006; Blackhurst et al., 2008, etc.). However, neither 
of the above-mentioned studies uses the Cournot competition model to analyze the impact of 
capacity investment and its related risk in supply chain competition. 
This paper’s main contribution is to link and extend the above works by considering the 
financing uncertainty of green supply chains in a Cournot competition model. This stylistic 
setting allows us to gain insight into the differences between various supply chain strategies 
when some chain needs financing aid for capacity investment. In this paper, we first introduce 
the asymmetric duopoly model of competing supply chains as benchmark, and discuss the effect 
of a per-unit subsidy policy to deal with the problem of asymmetric costs between traditional 
and green supply chains. Based on the benchmark model, we study supply chain competition 
with asymmetric financing uncertainty. The financing uncertainty of one chain’s capacity 
investment could be available as complete or incomplete information for the other chain. By 
analyzing and comparing the optimal quantities, optimal prices, and optimal profits in both 
cases, we find the effects of asymmetric capacity restriction and asymmetric information of 
financing uncertainty on the competition equilibria. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model. Section 3 
analyzes the Cournot competition model of supply chains with asymmetric financing 
uncertainty, in the cases of complete and incomplete information on financing uncertainty of 
the manufacturing and retailing capacity investment. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Supply chain competition model 
2.1. Benchmark model 
In this section, we consider the Cournot model of competing supply chains in which each 
chain is composed of a manufacturer servicing a single retailer. The timing of the game is as 
follows: 
1. The manufacturers and the retailers in two supply chains bargain simultaneously on the 
wholesale price, 𝑤𝑖, i = 1,2. 
2. The manufacturers and the retailers in the two supply chains agree simultaneously on 
the desired retailer’s order quantity, 𝑞𝑖, i = 1,2. Thereafter, the quantities of 𝑞𝑖  are 




3. The retailing prices 𝑝𝑖 , i = 1,2, are determined by market demand, and sales take place. 
We denote the first supply chain as the traditional chain and the second one as the green 
supply chain, which could be a new entrant in the industry. Compared to the traditional supply 
chain, the manufacturing or transportation technology in the green supply chain is more 
environmentally friendly and produces fewer emissions. Normally, the new entrant in the 
market may suffer the cost disadvantage, because its manufacturing or retailing capacity 
restrictions may impede the scale effect from taking place. We assume that the per-unit 




𝑅 denote the profit of the supply chain as a whole, the manufacturer’s profit, 
and the retailer’s profit, respectively. We can write these profit functions as follows:  
𝜋𝑖
𝑆𝐶 = 𝑞𝑖(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖), 𝑖 = 1,2;            (1) 
    𝜋𝑖
𝑀 = 𝑞𝑖(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑤𝑖), 𝑖 = 1,2;          (2) 
𝜋𝑖
𝑅 = 𝑞𝑖(𝑤𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖), 𝑖 = 1,2.        (3) 
One can find that 𝜋𝑖
𝑆𝐶 = 𝜋𝑖
𝑀 + 𝜋𝑖
𝑅 , 𝑖 = 1,2, which implies that the supply chain profit is the 
sum of the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profit.  
The manufacturers and retailers in the two supply chains bargain on the wholesale price, 
𝑤𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2 , to determine their respective profit shares. Following Wu et al. (2009), we 
formulate the bargaining process on the wholesale price between the manufacturer and the 
retailer as a Nash Bargaining game, which is firstly presented by Nash (1950) and extended by 
Kalai and Smordinsky (1975), and Binmore et al. (1986). In the bargaining stage, we let 𝛼 ∈
[0,1] be the bargaining power, and  𝛷𝑖(𝑤) denote the Nash bargaining product. Then, the 
Nash Bargaining Product model for a manufacturer and a retailer choosing a wholesale price 
𝑤𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2 is:  
                𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑤{𝛷𝑖(𝑤𝑖)} =  𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑤{(𝜋𝑖
𝑀)𝛼(𝜋𝑖
𝑅)1−𝛼}, 𝑖 = 1,2.               (4) 
Note that we allow the bargaining power parameter 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] , where 𝛼  is given 
exogenously.1 We first assume that 𝛼 = 0.5, which reflects a balance of bargaining power 










, 𝑖 = 1,2, i.e., the manufacturer and the retailer share the chain profit equally 
because their bargaining powers are balanced. 
To keep things simple and tractable, we consider the additive inverse demand function 
where the 𝑖th retailer’s price, 𝑝𝑖, depends on two elements: its own quantity of product, 𝑞𝑖, 
and the competitor’s quantity of product, 𝑞𝑗 (𝑗 ≠  𝑖), through a substituting coefficient 𝑏𝑖 ∈
                                                             
1 Note that Wu et al. (2009) has shown that the cases of 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛼 = 1 are equivalent to two special supply 
chain models, namely, Vertical Integration (VI) and Manufacturer’s Stackelberg (MS), respectively.  




 (0,1):3  
𝑝𝑖  =  𝑎𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖𝑞𝑗, 𝑖 =  1,2;  𝑗 =  3 − 𝑖.                 (5) 
As reflected in (5), 𝑏𝑖 =  0 implies that the chains are independent of each other, while 𝑏𝑖 =
 1 implies that the products are identical. We assume that 𝑎1 = 𝑎2 ≡ 𝑎, which implies that 
the highest possible quantity of demand of the two supply chains are identical; we also assume 
that 𝑏1 = 𝑏2 ≡ 𝑏, which implies that the substitution effects between the two supply chains 
are symmetric. By making these two assumptions, we can emphasize the effect of asymmetric 
costs (0 < 𝑐1 < 𝑐2 < 𝑎) on the competition between the traditional supply chain and the green 
supply chain.  
We denote ki, i = 1,2 , as the manufacturing capacities of two supply chains. If the 
production capacity of each manufacturer 𝑘𝑖 is large enough to meet the demand 𝑑𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2, 
it faced, then 𝑘𝑖 ≥ 𝑑𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖; otherwise, when the production capacity is less than demand, i.e., 
𝑘𝑖 < 𝑑𝑖, each manufacturer can only supply to its capacity, then 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑘𝑖 < 𝑑𝑖. 
In this benchmark model, we assume that manufacturers have sufficient capacity, we can 
ensure that 𝑑𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖, and we therefore rewrite the profit functions of supply chains as follows: 
𝜋𝑖
𝑆𝐶 = 𝑞𝑖(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖 −  𝑏𝑞𝑗 − 𝑐𝑖), 𝑖 =  1,2;  𝑗 =  3 − 𝑖.           (6) 





= 𝑎 − 2𝑞𝑖 −  𝑏𝑞𝑗 − 𝑐𝑖 = 0, 𝑖 =  1,2;  𝑗 =  3 − 𝑖.           (7) 





, 𝑖 =  1,2;  𝑗 =  3 − 𝑖.                    (8) 





, 𝑖 =  1,2;  𝑗 =  3 − 𝑖.                  (9) 





, 𝑖 =  1,2;  𝑗 =  3 − 𝑖.                (10) 
By calculating the optimal profits of the two supply chains, we can derive the following 
proposition of the benchmark model: 
 
Proposition 1. In the Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) of the asymmetric Cournot 
competition model of supply chains, the optimal profits of chains, manufacturers, and retailers 
are: 
                                                             
3 Instead of the demand function, we adopt the inverse demand function in our paper because we will be 


















]2, 𝑖 =  1;  𝑗 =  3 − 𝑖.          (12) 
 
It is clear that the optimal profit of the traditional supply chain is higher than that of the 
green supply chain, i.e., 𝜋1
𝑆C∗ > 𝜋2
SC∗ > 0, because the cost of the latter chain is higher, 𝑐1 <




SC∗. Similarly, we can define the price difference and the quantity difference in the 
equilibrium as ∆𝑝∗ ≡ 𝑝2
∗ − 𝑝1
∗ and ∆𝑞∗ ≡ 𝑞1
∗ − 𝑞2
∗, respectively. Some properties related to 
those differences can be summarized in the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 1. In the SPE of the asymmetric Cournot competition model of supply chains, as the 
cost difference between supply chains, ∆𝑐, increases, the price difference, ∆𝑝∗, the quantity 
difference, ∆𝑞∗, and the profit difference, ∆𝜋SC
∗
, increases. 
Proof: Employing the equations in (10), (9) and (11), we can derive the expressions of three 


















Taking the first order derivatives of ∆𝑝∗, ∆𝑞∗, and ∆𝜋SC
∗



























because 𝑏 ∈  (0,1) and 0 < 𝑐1 < 𝑐2 < 𝑎.  
 
From Lemma 1, we notice that—regardless of a decrease in 𝑐1  or an increase in 𝑐2 , 
which result in an increase in ∆𝑐—as the production costs become more asymmetric, the green 
supply chain will suffer the lower optimal price, lower optimal quantity, and lower optimal 
profit. To encourage the development of the green supply chain, government may need to 
consider some policy measures to reduce this cost difference.  
 
2.2. The asymmetric competing supply chains with government subsidy 




environmentally friendly technology, the government issues a subsidy policy, 𝑠 , to every 
product that the green supply chain sells to consumers. We can rewrite the profit functions of 
the green supply chain: 
𝜋2
𝑆𝐶 = 𝑞2(𝑎 − 𝑞2 −  𝑏𝑞1 − 𝑐2 + 𝑠),                    (13) 
while the profit function of the traditional supply chain remains the same as (7). Taking the 








= 𝑎 − 2𝑞2 −  𝑏𝑞1 − 𝑐2 + 𝑠 = 0,                  (15) 









                       (16) 
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.          (18) 
By calculating the optimal profits of the two supply chains, we can derive the following 
proposition of the benchmark model: 
 
Proposition 2. In the SPE of the asymmetric Cournot competition model of supply chains with 
government subsidy, the optimal profits of the chains are: 
𝜋1
𝑆𝐶∗ = [









Note that the manufacturer and the retailer in each chain still share the chain profit equally, 
because they have balanced bargaining powers. By comparing the results of Proposition 2 with 
that of the benchmark model, we find that 𝜋1
𝑆𝐶∗  decreases and 𝜋2
𝑆𝐶∗  increases, hence the 
profit difference ∆𝜋SC
∗
 decreases as a result of imposing a subsidy on the green supply chain. 
Some properties related to the government’s subsidy policy could be summarized in the 
following lemma: 
 
Lemma 2. In the SPE of the asymmetric Cournot competition model of supply chains with 
government subsidy, as the government subsidy of the green supply chain, 𝑠, increases, the 
price difference ∆𝑝∗, the quantity difference, ∆𝑞∗, and the profit difference, ∆𝜋𝑆𝐶
∗
, decrease. 





As shown in Lemma 2, the green supply chain enjoys a higher optimal price, higher 
optimal quantity, and higher optimal profit, as government increases its per-unit subsidy on the 
production of Chain 2. However, the green supply may face a manufacturing or retailing 
capacity restriction, which implies that Chain 2 is not able to produce sufficient quantity to 
satisfy consumer demand. This problem cannot be solved by the per-unit subsidy, and the green 
supply chain should seek funding from banks for investment in capacity. In the following 
section, we add the choice of corporate finance into our model and analyze the effects of the 
related financial uncertainty on capacity investment. 
 
3. The model with financing uncertainty 
3.1. Financing uncertainty on the investment of manufacturing capacity 
In this section, we consider the case where only the green supply chain faces the 
manufacturing capacity restriction and needs to borrow from the financial institution to invest 
in capacity. To simplify the expressions, we assume that 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 ≡ 𝑐, given that chains are 
still asymmetric in the sense of capacity restrictions. To meet the demand of consumers, 
Manufacturer 2 needs to increase its capacity by ∆𝑘2, and ask the financial institution for a 
loan 𝑙(∆𝑘2) , where 𝑙  is an increasing function of ∆𝑘2 , i.e., 𝑙
′(∆𝑘2) > 0 . The financial 
institution agrees to lend the loan 𝑙(∆𝑘2) with an exogenous probability 𝑢 ∈ (0,1), and uses 
𝑟 ∈ (0,1) as the interest rate. Hence, in this Cournot competition model of supply chains with 
asymmetric financing uncertainty in manufacturing capacity investment, the timing of the game 
becomes: 
1. Manufacturer 2 in the green supply chain, who faces a capacity restriction, asks the 
financial institution for a loan, 𝑙(∆𝑘2), to increase its capacity. The financial institution 
approves the loan application with probability 𝑢 ∈ (0,1) . If the loan is approved, 
Manufacturer 2 will receive the full loan amount with an interest rate 𝑟 ∈ (0,1).  
2. The manufacturers and retailers in the two supply chains bargain simultaneously on the 
wholesale price, 𝑤𝑖, i = 1,2. 
3. The manufacturers and the retailers in the two supply chains simultaneously agree on 
the desired retailer order quantity, 𝑞𝑖, i = 1,2. Thereafter, the quantities of 𝑞𝑖 are fully 
produced and delivered by the manufacturer.  
4. The retailing prices 𝑝𝑖 , i = 1,2, are determined by market demand, and sales take place. 
After retailing, Manufacturer 2 pays interest, 𝑟𝑙(∆𝑘2), to the financial institution and 
every player receives its payoff. 
Because of the financing uncertainty, there are two possible situations in this model. If 




denote the quantity and the price as 𝑞𝑖
ℎ and 𝑝𝑖
ℎ, respectively; similarly, let 𝑞𝑖
𝑙 and 𝑝𝑖
𝑙 denote 
the quantity and price if the loan application has been rejected and the capacity of Manufacturer 




ℎ − 𝑐) − 𝑟𝑙(∆𝑘2)] + (1 − 𝑢)𝑞2
𝑙 (𝑝2




ℎ − 𝑐) − 𝑟𝑙(∆𝑘2)] + (1 − 𝑢)𝑞2
𝑙 (𝑤2










ℎ = 𝑘2 + ∆𝑘2,  𝑞2
𝑙 = 𝑘2 . In this section, financing behavior constitutes complete 
information and every player in the game observes the outcome of the loan application. The 
financing uncertainty is resolved before a retail price 𝑝𝑖 is chosen.  
Before analyzing the optimal choices of the chains, we need to add a new assumption here 
to guarantee that the capacity restriction of Manufacturer 2 truly holds. By taking 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 ≡ 𝑐 
into (9) and (11), we can derive the optimal quantity and optimal profit of symmetric chains 










)2, 𝑖 =  1, 2.                       (20) 
Note that if there is no financing, the green supply chain faces the capacity restriction which 
implies that 𝑞2
∗  should be strictly larger than the capacity 𝑘2 , otherwise the capacity of 
Manufacturer 2 is not a restriction. Hence, we assume that 
𝑎−𝑐
4+𝑏
> 𝑘2. However, Manufacturer 
1 does not face any capacity restriction, and can produce its optimal quantity. The expected 




ℎ − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝑢)𝑞1
𝑙 (𝑝1




ℎ − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝑢)𝑞1
𝑙 (𝑤1









Given that Manufacturer 2 faces the capacity restriction if it has not received the loan, 𝑞2
𝑙 =





ℎ − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝑢)𝑞1
𝑙 (𝑎 − 𝑞1
𝑙 − 𝑏𝑘2 − 𝑐),        (19) 
𝜋2
𝑆𝐶 = 𝑢[𝑞2(𝑎 − 𝑞2
ℎ − 𝑏𝑞1
ℎ − 𝑐) − 𝑟𝑙(𝑞2
ℎ − 𝑘2)] + (1 − 𝑢)𝑘2(𝑎 − 𝑘2 − 𝑏𝑞1
𝑙 − 𝑐).  
(20) 
Taking the first order derivatives with respect to 𝑞1
𝑙 , 𝑞1
ℎ, and 𝑞2




𝑙 = 𝑎 − 2𝑞1




ℎ = 𝑎 − 2𝑞1
ℎ − 𝑏𝑞2




ℎ = 𝑢[𝑎 − 2𝑞2
ℎ − 𝑏𝑞1
ℎ − 𝑐) − 𝑟𝑙′(∆𝑘2)] = 0.            (23) 




















.                     (26) 
Note that the optimal choice of 𝑞1
𝑙∗ has been derived in (24), given that 𝑞2
𝑙∗ = 𝑘2. Solving 
equations (25) and (26), the optimal quantities of two chains when Manufacturer 2 has 



















 is the optimal quantity of two symmetric chains 
without capacity restriction. Due to the capacity restriction of Manufacturer 2, Chain 1 can 
supply more output compared to the benchmark model, while Chain 2 supplies less. We need 
the inequality condition 𝑞2
ℎ∗ > 𝑘2 to hold, otherwise Manufacturer 2 will lack the incentive 
to invest in capacity. By deriving 𝑞2
ℎ∗ > 𝑘2, we get 
              𝑟 < ?̅? ≡
(2−𝑏)(𝑎−𝑐)−(4−𝑏2)𝑘2
2𝑙′(∆𝑘2)
,                      (29) 
which implies that the affordable interest rate range for Manufacturer 2, 𝑟 ∈ [0, ?̅?]. Note that 
the inequality (29) is not affected by the financing uncertainty coefficient 𝑢. Substituting 
(24), (27), (28), and 𝑞2











,                         (31) 
𝑝1
ℎ∗ = 𝑎 −
(2+𝑏−𝑏2)(𝑎−𝑐)−𝑏𝑟𝑙′(∆𝑘2)
4−𝑏2
,                     (32) 
𝑝2
ℎ∗ = 𝑎 −
(2+𝑏−𝑏2)(𝑎−𝑐)−(2−𝑏2)𝑟𝑙′(∆𝑘2)
4−𝑏2
.                   (33) 
Note that the financing uncertainty 𝑢 is not included in all expressions of optimal quantities 
(24), (28) and (29), or in all expressions of optimal prices (30)–(33). This follows because in 
this complete information case, each player observes the outcome of the loan application before 
the optimal quantities and prices are determined. The game can be reduced into two sub-games 
of complete information, with the results remaining the same. By calculating the optimal profits 
of the two supply chains, we can derive the following proposition of the model: 
 
Proposition 3. In the SPE of the Cournot competition model of supply chains with asymmetric 












,          (34) 
𝜋2











                   (35) 
 





)2, 𝑖 =  1, 2, we can derive that the optimal profit of the traditional supply chain 
(34) is higher than (
𝑎−𝑐
2+𝑏









𝑆𝐶∗ . Some properties related to this inequality can be 
summarized in the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 3. In the SPE of the Cournot competition model of supply chains with asymmetric 
financing uncertainty in terms of manufacturing capacity, as the financing uncertainty of the 
green supply chain, 𝑢, increases, the optimal profit of the traditional supply chain decreases 
and the optimal profit of the green supply chain increases. 
Proof: See the Appendix A.  
 
Lemma 3 shows that a preferential policy to provide more financing opportunities to the 
green supply chain will encourage its development. By increasing the probability of getting the 
loan, the green supply chain will be better off if its corporate finance risk reduces. However, 
does this result still hold when the financing uncertainty represents incomplete information to 
the traditional supply chain? 
 
3.2. The asymmetric information of financing uncertainty  
 
If the financing uncertainty represents incomplete information to the traditional supply 
chain, we can rewrite the following expected profit functions of the two chains: 
𝜋1
𝑆𝐶 = 𝑢𝑞1(𝑎 − 𝑞1 − 𝑏𝑞2
ℎ − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝑢)𝑞1(𝑎 − 𝑞1 − 𝑏𝑞2




ℎ − 𝑏𝑞1 − 𝑐) − 𝑟𝑙(𝑞2
ℎ − 𝑘2)] + (1 − 𝑢)𝑞2
𝑙 (𝑎 − 𝑞2
𝑙 − 𝑏𝑞1 − 𝑐), 
where 𝑞2
𝑙 = 𝑘2 < 𝑞2
ℎ = 𝑘2 + ∆𝑘2. Note that there is only a single quantity choice 𝑞1 for the 
traditional supply chain because it cannot observe the result of the loan application. The 
traditional supply chain has to decide the optimal quantity choice 𝑞1 in dealing with two 
possible situations, but it is not able to distinguish which situation the chain faces. Taking the 
first order derivatives with respect to 𝑞1 and 𝑞2







= 𝑢(𝑎 − 2𝑞1 − 𝑏𝑞2




ℎ = 𝑢[𝑎 − 2𝑞2
ℎ − 𝑏𝑞1 − 𝑐 − 𝑟𝑙′(∆𝑘2)] = 0.              (37) 











.                        (39) 











.                   (41) 
Note that we still need the inequality condition 𝑞2
ℎ∗ > 𝑘2 to hold, otherwise Manufacturer 2 
will lack the incentive to invest in its capacity. By deriving 𝑞2





which is the same inequality as (29); this inequality is not affected by the financing 
uncertainty coefficient 𝑢. By taking the first order derivative of 𝑞2









.                    (42) 









, which is the optimal quantity of Chain 1 given that it receives the information that 






, which is the optimal quantity of Chain 1 given that it 
receives the information that Manufacturer 2 has obtained the loan and increased the capacity 
successfully in (27). We can derive that 
𝑞1
∗ = 𝑢𝑞1
ℎ∗ + (1 − 𝑢)𝑞1
𝑙∗,                       (43) 
which implies that the optimal quantity choice of Chain 1 in the incomplete information 
model is a weighted average of two optimal quantities in the complete information case, by 
using the financing uncertainty of Chain 2, 𝑢, as the weight. Compared to the complete 
information model, Chain 2 will face less intense competition if it has not obtained the loan, 
since Chain 1 will choose a quantity 𝑞1
∗ < 𝑞1
𝑙∗; otherwise, if Chain 2 has obtained the loan, it 
will face more intense competition, since Chain 1 will choose a quantity 𝑞1
∗ > 𝑞1
ℎ∗. 
















> 0 if and only if inequality (29) holds. Compared to the optimal quantity 
of Manufacturer 2, who successfully increases its capacity in the case of complete 
information in (28), we can find that 𝑞2
ℎ∗ in the incomplete information model is lower. This 
follows because Manufacturer 1 can only choose a quantity 𝑞1
∗ to produce in two possible 
situations and 𝑞1
∗ > 𝑞1







Because 𝑢 ∈ (0,1) and inequality (29) holds, we can derive that ∆𝑞2
ℎ∗ < 0. 
We can then calculate the optimal prices of the two chains: 
𝑝1




,             (46) 
𝑝2




,              (47) 
𝑝1




,         (48) 
𝑝2
ℎ∗ = 𝑎 −
(2+𝑏−𝑢𝑏2)(𝑎−𝑐)−(2−𝑢𝑏2)𝑟𝑙′(∆𝑘2)−(1−𝑢)𝑏𝑘2
4−𝑢𝑏2
.            (49) 
Summarizing the results above, we can get the following proposition about the optimal 
quantities and optimal prices in the incomplete information model: 
 
Proposition 4. In the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the Cournot competition model 
of supply chains with asymmetric financing uncertainty of manufacturing capacity, for the 
optimal quantities, 𝑞1
∗ = 𝑢𝑞1





𝑙∗ ≡ 𝑘2, 𝑞2
ℎ∗is lower in 
comparison with the complete information case. For the optimal prices,  𝑝1
𝑙∗, 𝑝2
𝑙∗ are higher 
in comparison with the complete information case. The effects on 𝑝1
ℎ∗ and 𝑝2
ℎ∗ depend on the 
value of 𝑟 ∈ (0, ?̅?]; if 𝑟 ∈ (0, 𝑟∗), 𝑝1
ℎ∗ and 𝑝2
ℎ∗ are higher; if 𝑟 ∈ (𝑟∗, 𝑟∗∗), 𝑝1
ℎ∗ is lower 
and 𝑝2
ℎ∗is higher; if 𝑟 ∈ ( 𝑟∗∗, ?̅?], 𝑝1
ℎ∗ and 𝑝2
ℎ∗ are lower, in comparison with the complete 
information case.4 
Proof: The first part of the proposition, which comprises the discussions of optimal 
quantities, has been shown above; for the second part of the proposition, which comprises 
the discussions of optimal prices, see the Appendix B. 
 
We have discussed the complete and incomplete information models of the effect of 
financing uncertainty on manufacturing capacity. What would happen if Retailer 2, instead of 
Manufacturer 2, faces the capacity restriction?  
                                                             
4 We could still discuss the properties of optimal profits in the incomplete information model as Proposition 3. 
However, the expected profit functions in this section become much more complicated, and we cannot derive 





3.3. Financing uncertainty on the investment of retailing networks  
In this section, we consider the case that only the green supply chain needs to receive 
financing from banks to invest in its retailing capacity to meet market demand. In this model, 
Retailer 2 needs to increase its capacity by ∆𝑘2, and ask the financial institution for the loan 
𝑙(∆𝑘2) with an interest rate 𝑟. Similarly, we can write the expected profit functions of the 
green supply chain when it faces a retailing capacity constraint, and can receive the loan 𝑙(∆𝑘2) 




ℎ − 𝑐) − 𝑟𝑙(∆𝑘2)] + (1 − 𝑢)𝑞2
𝑙 (𝑝2




ℎ − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝑢)𝑞2
𝑙 (𝑤2










ℎ = 𝑘2 + ∆𝑘2, 𝑞2
𝑙 = 𝑘2. One can find that the chain profit of 𝜋2
𝑆𝐶 is exactly the same 
as for the model of manufacturing capacity, while the chain profit of 𝜋1
𝑆𝐶 remains unchanged 
as in the previous model. Hence, we can derive the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5. In the Cournot competition model of supply chains with asymmetric financing 
uncertainty, the optimal quantities, optimal prices, and optimal profits are the same for both 
the manufacturing capacity restriction case and the retailing capacity restriction case, 
regardless of whether the financing uncertainty represents complete or incomplete information. 
  
The main results of our analysis remain the same in the case of a retailing capacity 
restriction, because the bargaining powers of the manufacturer and retailer in both supply chains 
are balanced, i.e., 𝛼 = 0.5. The manufacturing and retailing capacity restrictions cause similar 
effects on chain profit, which is shared equally by the manufacturer and the retailer. However, 
do the results in the previous analysis still hold if the bargaining powers of the manufacturer 
and retailer are unbalanced? 
 
3.4. The unbalanced bargaining powers 
In the previous analysis, we assumed that the bargaining power parameter between a 
manufacturer and a retailer in any supply chain, 𝛼 = 0.5, to derive the explicit functions of 
equilibrium quantities, prices, and profits. However, 𝛼 could be any value within the interval 
[0,1]. Recall that the Nash Bargaining Product model of choosing a wholesale price 𝑤𝑖 is:  
Max𝑤𝑖{𝛷𝑖(𝑤𝑖)} =  Max𝑤𝑖{(𝜋𝑖
𝑀)𝛼(𝜋𝑖
𝑅)1−𝛼}, 𝑖 = 1,2. 
By taking the first order derivative with respect to 𝛼, we can derive the F.O.C. condition,  
𝛼𝑞𝑖
𝛼(𝑤𝑖 − 𝑐)
𝛼−1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑞𝑖
1−𝛼(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑤𝑖)
−𝛼 = 0.              (51) 













1−2𝛼.                        (52) 
Note that as 𝛼 increases, 𝑤𝑖
∗ must increase for the equation to hold. Hence, 𝑤𝑖
∗ is increasing 
in 𝛼. An increase in the bargaining parameter 𝛼 will result in an increase in the wholesale 
price and an increase in the manufacturer’s share of chain profit. Given any 𝛼 ∈ (0,1), we can 
still derive consistent properties of market equilibria as in our previous analysis, except that the 
shares of profit distribution between manufacturer and retailer are different. Although the 
explicit functions of optimal quantities, optimal prices, and optimal profits in competing equilibria 
for the general bargaining power parameter 𝛼 cannot be solved, we can use some values of 𝛼 ∈
[0,1], other than 0.5, to repeat the previous analysis. The simplest cases should be 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛼 =
1, which are equivalent to the cases of Vertical Integration (VI) and Manufacturer’s Stackelberg 
(MS) in [25]. By assuming 𝛼 = 0 or 𝛼 = 1, we can derive the same propositions and lemmas as 
in the previous analysis, except for the wholesale prices and the shares of chain profit between 
manufacturers and retailers. This follows because in two extreme cases, only the retailers or the 




In this paper, we introduced the Cournot competition model of asymmetric supply chains 
as the benchmark, and discussed the effect of a per-unit subsidy policy to deal with the problem 
of asymmetric costs between traditional and green supply chains. We then added the financing 
uncertainty about capacity investment into the benchmark model. The financing uncertainty of 
the green supply chain’s capacity investment could be available as complete or incomplete 
information to the traditional supply chain. We find that, in the complete information case, the 
financing uncertainty of capacity investment does not affect the choices of optimal quantities 
and optimal prices, because both chains can observe the outcome of the loan application. If this 
information is incomplete for the traditional supply chain, the financing uncertainty plays an 
important role in the determination of optimal quantities and optimal prices, together with the 
interest rate of the loan. In either case, the green supply chain benefits from the preferential 
loan, which could increase its probability of getting the loan for capacity investment. 
Some policy implications can be derived from the model results. To encourage the 
development of green supply chains, government should use per-unit subsidy if the green 
supply chain suffers the cost disadvantage, and should encourage financial institutions to 
provide preferential loans to a green supply chain if it faces capacity restrictions. Specifically, 
if government wants the manufacturer in a supply chain with retailing capacity restrictions to 
adopt environmentally friendly technology, it may be useful to encourage financial institutions 





A limitation of our model is that the financial institution’s decision is not endogenous, due 
to the model’s complexity. It could be an interesting approach for government to motivate 
financial intuitions to provide more preferential loans for the development of green supply 
chains. The model framework could be richer if the optimal loan decisions of financial 
intuitions, or perhaps competition among financial intuitions, were added. Another possible 
direction for further research is the empirical verification of model results. By collecting the 
data of some traditional and green supply chains, an empirical analysis may assist with the 
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Appendix A 
The proof of Lemma 3 
Proof: Taking the first order derivatives of 𝜋1













.            (A.1) 
Because 𝑟 < ?̅? ≡
(2−𝑏)(𝑎−𝑐)−(4−𝑏2)𝑘2
2𝑙′(∆𝑘2)
 as shown in (29), we can derive that 𝑏𝑟𝑙′(∆𝑘2) −













The proof of Proposition 4 (second part) 
Proof: For the changes of optimal prices, 𝑞1
∗ < 𝑞1
𝑙∗, and 𝑞2
𝑙∗ ≡ 𝑘2, recall the inverse demand 
function in (5),   
𝑝𝑖  =  𝑎𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖𝑞𝑗, 𝑖 =  1,2;  𝑗 =  3 − 𝑖.                   
We can derive that  𝑝1
𝑙∗, 𝑝2




To analyze the effects on 𝑝1





[𝑏(2 − 𝑏)(𝑎 − 𝑐) − 2𝑟𝑙′(∆𝑘2) − (4 − 𝑏
2)𝑘2].     (B.1) 
Let denote 𝑟∗ ≡
𝑏(2−𝑏)(𝑎−𝑐)−(4−𝑏2)𝑘2
2𝑙′(∆𝑘2)
. Because the substituting coefficient 𝑏 ∈  (0,1), 𝑟∗ < ?̅?, 
where ?̅? is the highest affordable interest rate for Manufacturer 2. 





[(2 − 𝑏)(𝑎 − 𝑐) − 2𝑟𝑙′(∆𝑘2) −
(4−𝑏2)
𝑏
𝑘2].      (B.2) 
Let denote 𝑟∗∗ ≡
𝑏(2−𝑏)(𝑎−𝑐)−(4−𝑏2)𝑘2
2𝑏𝑙′(∆𝑘2)
. Because the substituting coefficient 𝑏 ∈  (0,1), 𝑟∗ <
𝑟∗∗ < ?̅?, where ?̅? is the highest affordable interest rate for Manufacturer 2. 
Hence, if 𝑟 ∈ (0, 𝑟∗), 𝑝1
ℎ∗ and 𝑝2
ℎ∗ are higher; if 𝑟 ∈ (𝑟∗, 𝑟∗∗), 𝑝1
ℎ∗ is lower and 𝑝2
ℎ∗is 
higher; if 𝑟 ∈ ( 𝑟∗∗, ?̅?], 𝑝1
ℎ∗ and 𝑝2
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